The dominant logical theory of belief revision, AGM (Alchourron, Gärdenfors and Makinson), imposes an amount of idealisation on cognitive agents revising their beliefs in the light of new information: their belief states are perfectly consistent, closed under the full force of classical logic, and they know all logical truths. Humans are not like that: they can hold inconsistent beliefs; their belief states are not classically closed; and they can be subject to framing effects, revising their beliefs in different ways when presented with logically equivalent options (‘If you apply for the job, you have 40% chances of making it’ vs ‘… you have 60% chances of failing’). Behavioural economics has shown the momentous consequences of framing in social choice and decision theory, where presenting the same situation positively (‘glass half full’) or negatively (‘glass half empty’) can lead to dramatically different beliefs and choices. In this talk, I present a semantics for a belief revision operator which is hyperintensional, that is, capable of modelling distinctions more fine-grained than classical logical equivalence, and in particular, framing effects and inconsistent beliefs. Unlike most approaches to belief revision for non-ideal agents, my semantics does not resort to non-classical logics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional modal logic with a simple mereology of contents.